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Introduction
The Zambian economy has been in severe decline for
10 years. A very large part of Zambia's difficulties is
explicable by international events: most recently the
recession, overlying the long-term depression in
copper prices since 1974, drought since 1979, the
effects of oil price increases, and, between 1965 and
1979 the consequences of the liberation struggle in
Zimbabwe and the economic sanctions against the
illegal regime. In 1981, the World Bank estimated that
two-thirds of the fall in Zambia's per capita income
between 1974 and 1978 could be explained by these
external events [World Bank 198 1:79]. Yet from 1964
to 1970, the first years after Independence, Zambia
experienced boom conditions, there were massive
infrastructural and productive investments, and large
rises in living standards for parts of the population.
Why, therefore, was Zambia not better equipped to
withstand the subsequent shocks? And what is now
being done to encourage a revival of the Zambian
economy?
The Economics of Adjustment in a Mineral
Exporting Economy
Consider an economy consisting of three sectors: the
mineral sector, other tradeable goods and non-
tradeables) Tradeables here refer to those goods
whose prices are set on international markets, subject
to transport costs, tariffs and the nominal exchange
rate; while the prices of non-tradeables are determined
by domestic costs and demand conditions. With full
employment and immobility of capital in the short run
there are two effects of a minerals boom. The first is
This section isa brief summary ofa now widely used account ofihe
economics ofa minerals boom, see, for example, Corden and Neary
(1982). or Gelb (1981).
* Support for the research upon which this article is based
was provided by the UK Overseas Development Admini-
stration under Research Scheme R3848 Adjustment
Problems of Mineral Exporting Countries', However, the
views expressed here are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the ODA.
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termed a resource movement effect. The marginal
product of labour rises in the booming sector, causing
labour to move out of other sectors. This reduces
non-tradeables output (while the necessary tradeable
goods can be imported), so there is a rise in non-
tradeables prices unless spending is somehow reduced.
The real effective exchange rate (the price of non-
tradeables relative to tradeables) therefore rises,
possibly reinforcing the contractionary effect on the
'other tradeables' sector.
The second effect is called the spending effect.
Increased absorption raises the price of services, and
once again we have real exchange rate appreciation.
Additional demand for goods from the lagging sector
is met from imports. This real appreciation causes
further loss of labour from the 'other tradeables'
sector.
The resource movement effect may be relatively small
if specialised types of labour are required in the
booming sector. The extent of the spending effect
depends on the marginal propensity to consume non-
tradeables and the availability of suitable unemployed
resources. If the channel for domestic absorption of
mineral rents is through government spending, the
marginal propensity is likely to be high. While there
may be high unemployment, the unemployed labour
and resources may not be suited to rapid expansion of
non-tradeables output. In ldcs the assumption of
mobile unskilled labour, coupled with a 'specific
factor' called capital (but perhaps including some
forms of skilled labour) may well be realistic for
mining.
Given wage-price flexibility, the process should
reverse when the boom subsides. The subsequent
productive capacity of the economy depends on the
consumption and accumulation decisions made
during the boom; if investments are low yielding (a
common recent phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa)
then the efficient range of potential production may be
narrower than would otherwise have been the case.
Real depreciation, however, is difficult if costs in the
non-tradeables sector are difficult to reduce. If real
wages are inflexible, there may be long duration
unemployment. Furthermore, if new industries
established in potentially tradeable sectors are given
substantial protection, but continue to require traded
inputs when the boom subsides, adjustment will be all
the more difficult. Commercial policy can alter the
location of the division between tradeable and non-
tradeable goods. If protection permits a potentially
tradeable item to be produced locally at a cost that
exceeds the world market price, then, in effect, this
activity is part of the non-tradeables sector in the
country concerned. This analysis is applicable to much
of the manufacturing industry established in Zambia
in the aftermath of the mineral boom of the 1960s.
The politics of public sector management and
investment allocation are central to the spending
effect. Rapidly rising mineral revenues may quickly
exhaust high yielding public sector projects. There will
be a tendency to invest in low-yielding infrastructure
projects. Public expenditure control may be relaxed,
as may revenue-raising efforts outside the mineral
sector. The financial intermediary role of government
will support rent-seeking in the private sector,
particularly if there is a prevalence of fixed factors in
the non-tradeables sector (such as urban land). There
will be a wage stimulus in the public sector itself, and a
demonstration effect on wage costs and consumption
patterns from the import of the required foreign skills.
In the phase of decline of mineral revenues, there is
likely to be a strong tendency to rely on controls,
which in effect inhibit the adjustment process, and to
support existing levels of spending through borrowing.
In the real economy of a country such as Zambia it is
unlikely to be possible to move smoothly and swiftly
from one production structure to another, by way of a
smooth and continuous process of price adjustment.2
First, the structure will not adapt where price
flexibility does not exist. Second, even with price
flexibility, the structural problem may persist if price
responsiveness is low, i.e. if price elasticities of supply
and demand in particular markets are low. Third,
certain combinations of production possibilities may
not, in fact, be feasible so that new investment is
required to move from one production point to
another.
The Evolution of the Zambian Economy
The Zambian economy is the creation of copper
exports. Cheap, subsidised food was grown on
European-owned farms to feed mineworkers and
public servants. African peasant farmers were
2 These points are developed rn a recent paper by Pramii Chaudhuri
(1984).
discriminated against in their access to inputs and
markets, but at the same time were prevented from
responding to incentives and moving to the towns by
colonial administrative controls. When Independence
came in 1964, the government moved rapidly to
recapture mineral rents for Zambia from the mining
companies themselves, and from the former Govern-
ment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
Controls on the movement of population were also
removed. The price of copper tended to be relatively
high in the middle and late 1960s, so the ground was
prepared for a classic minerals boom.
The urban share of Zambia's population rose from
20 per cent to 45 per cent over 1963 to 1980. There was
a high rate of investment in the boom years (on
average 30 per cent of GDP), but the investment was
mainly channelled towards protected manufacturing
activities and low-yielding infrastructure, with agri-
culture relatively deprived of investment funds. In
more recent years an increasing portion of investment
was devoted to replacements.
There were very large real wage rises over 1964 to
1970; these were at first led by mineworkers, but then
by public sector workers and transport workers. In
other words, wage increases originated in the booming
sector and the non-tradeables sector. The real earnings
of citizens approximately doubled over the period.
There were large increases in public sector employ-
ment. These implied a growth of relatively unpro-
ductive bureaucracy, and also a significant expansion
of services to support employees in the public sector.3
The demand pressures induced by booming mineral
revenues and the wage increases conceded accelerated
the rate of price inflation in all non-traded activities.
At the same time the trading difficulties brought about
by Rhodesian UDI, and to a lesser extent, the use of
protection to support import-substituting industries
effectively increased the weight of 'non-traded'
activities in the economy: it was no longer a simple or
cheap matter to import construction services, raw
materials and many types of manufactures. Imported
goods with no local substitutes were liable to periodic
supply interruptions; their domestic prices tended to
increase during these interruptions. As a result,
Zambia's overall rate of price inflation during the
period from mid- 1964to mid-1968 was about 2t/2 times
the rate of inflation in the countries from which her
imports came. The real effective exchange rate for the
Zambian currency appreciated by some 29 per cent
over this period; in other words, adjusting for
exchange rate changes, costs to Zambian producers
increased on average by about 29 per cent relative to
For further discussion see Fry (1979) and Daniel (1979).
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those facing the competing suppliers of the Zambian
market.4
The shift in the cost structure of the Zambian economy
was consistent with both external balance and the
provision of wage jobs or self-employment oppor-
tunities for those who sought them only as long as the
terms of trade (and capital inflows) allowed high and
rising real levels of public spending to be sustained. It
is unlikely, however, that the rise in the real effective
exchange rate could have been arrested at the time by
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. The
domestic policy contribution to the problem lay in the
absence of an effective stabilisation strategy for
domestic incomes and expenditures: mineral revenues
were spent as they accrued, and the lack of an incomes
policy permitted strong urban unions to achieve very
large real wage increases.
Between 1965 and 1970 total public expenditure in
1970 prices grew at an average annual rate of 19.3 per
cent. Between 1966 and 1973, 55 per cent of new
recorded wage employment was generated in the
public sector, and 40 per cent in government services
alone.
In 1968 much of existing manufacturing industry was
partially nationalised. In 1969 the government took a
51 per cent stake in the mining industry. At this time
there was a rapid expansion of the public sector, and a
shift towards managed markets for both agricultural
and industrial commodities. This was very quickly to
be intensified once revenues began to decline. Zambia
ended the 1960s with a vastly increased urban interest
to serve; public sector employees were an important
element in this interest. There has been a substantial
withdrawal of labour from rural areas and an
associated increase in the number of female-headed
households in poorer rural areas.
The balance of investment, government expenditure
and employment opportunities turned progressively
against rural areas in general and agriculture in
particular. Relative price changes compounded the
effect. The barter terms of trade between rural and
urban areas has shown a steady deterioration from the
point of view of the rural areas; the deterioration was
estimated at 20 per cent between 1964 and 1973 [Fry
1979:74], and a further 30 per cent from 1973 to 1979
[ILO]. Thus, very roughly, the farmer had to sell twice
as much output in 1979 as in 1963 to buy the same
amount of urban-manufactured goods.
Calculation of exchange rate indices is discussed by Maciejewski
(1983); this index is computed as a geometrically weighted average
of trading partners' currency and price indices using 1969-71
average import weights. Revised 1979-81 weights are used later (see
note 5).
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The emergence of the present crisis
Zambia approached the first oil shock and the 1974
collapse of the copper market with a social and
economic structure ill-prepared for the adjustment
effort that was to be required. Despite high rates of
gross investment there had been no significant shift
away from dependence upon the mining industry as
the source of more than 90 per cent of export earnings.
The investments made in infrastructure and import-
substitution industries proved to be low-yielding and
to require increasing maintenance expenditures. The
manufacturing sector relied upon high levels of
natural and administrative protection, and on the
ready availability of imported inputs. The relative
prices of many of the imported inputs (notably, but
not only, fuel) increased sharply during the 1970s.
The public sector had been greatly enlarged, in terms
of employment, managerial responsibilities and the
provision of subsidies or services. This enlargement
rested upon high and rising mineral revenues, and any
attempt at contraction was likely to generate
resistance from public sector employees and bene-
ficiaries. In the same vein, organised workers in urban
areas had grown accustomed to regular increases in
real wages already high by regional standards.
The greatly strengthened urban interest groups were
likely to be the key to political stability in Zambia.
Nationalist politics before Independence had been
competitive and tense; there was a particularly uneasy
relationship between the mineworkers' union and the
ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP)
[Bates 1971:126-46]. The fragile political order was
bolstered by a stream of high-profile initiatives
(nationalisation, Zambianisation, administrative
controls and development schemes), by the encour-
agement of a proportionately large bureaucracy, and
by rapid circulation of senior military, civil service,
and parastatal personnel.
Zambian economic history in the l970s was
dominated by efforts to protect the expanded urban
interest, and consumption standards in general.
Controls spread very rapidly throughout the economy:
on pricing, marketing, foreign exchange and foreign
trade. At the same time subsidies were maintained and
increased on a wide range of items. The principal
subsidies were intended to lower the cost of food to the
urban consumer; but subsidies also extended, for
example, to some classes of agricultural inputs, and to
interest rates on credit to modern industry. In the
closing years of the l970s there was very substantial
borrowing by the government and the parastatal
sector to maintain public consumption levels.
Meanwhile Zambia was plagued by external problems.
The price of copper was depressed in 1972,
temporarily reached new peaks in 1973-74, and then
collapsed. By 1980 the income terms of trade had
deteriorated to 37 per cent of the 1970 level. The
aftermath of Rhodesian UD! in 1965 was prolonged
beyond all expectations: Zambia bore the brunt of
efforts to impose economic sanctions on the illegal
regime and was forced to invest substantially in the
redirection of its transport routes. From about 1974
Zambia suffered from the intensification of the armed
struggle in Rhodesia, from civil war in Angola, and
from chronic instability in the Shaba province of
neighbouring Zaire. On top of all these difficulties
came natural and ecological difficulties. From 1979,
Zambia, in common with other countries in the
region, began to suffer unusual degrees of drought.
Then in the 1980s it became clear that the mining
industry itself would not last for ever; realistic
appraisals of the possibility of depletion of the
Copperbelt ore bodies began to appear. Total copper
production began a steady decline somewhat earlier,
and unit costs increased precisely when prices were at
their weakest.
The maintenance of consumption relative to invest-
ment meant that there were huge net national dis-
savings. Net national savings in real terms were
negative in 1983 and had, in effect, fallen by 112 per
cent from the 1970s level. The core of the problem lay
with central government: the government current
deficit reached il per cent of gross domestic income in
1981 and 12.5 per cent in 1982.
Underpinning the maintenance of consumption levels
was a significant rise in the share of compensation of
employees in net domestic factor income: the share
rose from approximately 51 per cent in 1970 to nearly
62 per cent in 1983, indicating that profits and self-
employment incomes bore a proportionately greater
share of the external squeeze on Zambia's economy
while wage incomes were protected.
External and Internal Imbalances
Inflationary pressures remained consistently strong
over the 1970s: Zambia's average rate of inflation
from 1973 to 1982 exceeded the average for her trading
partners by some 28 per cent (using official consumer
price indices). The rate of inflation appears to have
been directly affected by the availability of foreign
exchange for imports; when, in 1979 and 1980, copper
and cobalt prices temporarily improved, Zambia's
rate of inflation decelerated. Zambia's competitive
position was thus liable to rapid deterioration. Despite
two devaluations of the kwacha, Zambia's real
effective exchange rate in 1980 was only slightly below
the level reached in 1970 at the end of the minerals
boom. Further sharp real appreciation occurred up to
the end of 1982. These calculations probably
understate the full extent of the problem because of the
pervasiveness of official price controls.
External payments arrears (the 'pipeline') began to
accumulate in 1975. They accumulated in every year
thereafterexcept 1979, totalling K702.6 mn by the end
of 1983 [Bank of Zambia 1983:52]. The other element
of debt which has risen very rapidly is that to the TMF.
By the end of 1984 outstanding debt to the Fund was
SDR 712 mn or about 28 per cent of GDP. Of the total
debt outstanding at the end of December 1983 of
$2,638 mn, the different categories of debt accounted
for the following amounts [World Bank 1984:56]:
The total converts to K3,985.5 mn, to which we can
add the outstanding arrears and the IMF debt of
SDR 635.7 mn at the end of 1983. This would give a
total debt outstanding at the end of 1983 of about
K5.5 bn or 130 per cent of GDP.
The debt service obligations arising from these
outstanding amounts are of course enormous: in 1984
servicing the IMF alone was to cost K247 mn, total
debt service (unrescheduled) would have been about
Kl.4 bn. With FOB exports estimated at K1433.0 mn,
debt service obligations, unrescheduled, account for
virtually 100 per cent of export earnings, while the
obligation to clear the pipeline increases notional debt
service by a further 60 per cent.
The ILO/JASPA mission of 1980 assembled disturbing
evidence of the effects of Zambia's decline upon the
poorest groups [ILO/JASPA 1981]. It identified
declining standards of nutrition, shortages of basic
supplies in the education and health systems, and lack
of investment in the kinds of assets, inputs or
technologies which could help low-income households
in areas away from the line of rail. It also pointed to
the relative protection of the urban interest by means
of food subsidies, expanding public sector employment
and periodic money wage increases.
The combination of general economic deterioration,
foreign exchange shortage and controls has led to
widespread price distortions, illegal transactions and
smuggling. Such transactions, however, have not
reached the levels experienced in some neighbouring
economies. Capacity utilisation in the manufacturing
sector is probably as low as 30 per cent, principally
because of the constraint upon imported inputs. The
growth of agricultural production has remained







drought, whatever the price position; the peak of
750,000 tonnes marketed production in 1976 has not
been repeated, though price developments now make
this possible if weather conditions are favourable.
Production of animal products has risen, but that of
other agricultural commodities has been stagnant. In
general, the economy exhibits all the symptoms of
severe deterioration: there has been slow physical
output growth, and an absolute reduction in some
sectors. Infrastructure is deteriorating at a rapid rate,
maintenance has not been carried out, and by 1982 a
severe risk had emerged of the kind of downward
spiral of activity experienced in some other sub-
Saharan countries.
The Reform Programme
The programme begun in December 1982 is
comprehensive and strongly supported by the
international financial institutions. Zambia has taken
action on the exchange rate, agricultural producer
prices, industrial output prices and the price control
system, incentives to exporters including special
provisions for retention of foreign exchange from non-
traditional exports, measures to tighten the budget
and budgetary management, wage policy measures
and reform of the import tariff. External support has
been secured for a $300 mn rehabilitation programme
in the mining industry, and new taxes have been
imposed to restore a revenue contribution from
mining.
The prospects for any substantial recovery of mineral
export earnings are poor; the price of copper is
expected to remain depressed for the rest of the
decade, and Zambia's output levels are in any case
tending to fall. The economy faces the basic problem
of how to prevent the incomes of all social groups from
falling. Within the general problem, there are
distributional implications of any recovery. At present
an economic recovery appears to mean redistribution
of income from wage and salary earners, subsidy
recipients and rent seekers, to profit recipients,
farmers in general, and foreign creditors.
The necessary structural change in Zambia means
shifting the economy from one which is mineral
dependent, with a large public sector, managed
markets, and extremely open (in terms of ratio of trade
to GDP) towards a more diversified, more private
sector-dominated economy, with freer markets, but
probably less open in terms of the importance of
foreign trade if self-sufficiency in basic foods is
achieved and if the manufacturing sector raises its
proportionate use of local inputs. These structural
changes have to be achieved while the economy
remains a net exporter of capital for at least five years,
as it pays off its accumulated burden of foreign debt.
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The principal stabilisation objective is to raise the
savings rate to the point where there is an excess of
national saving over investment, and a counterpart
balance of payments surplus on current account.
Unless this is done (and assuming that no massive
increase in grant aid is available) Zambia cannot be a
net exporter of capital and thus cannot service her
debt. Since negative saving is overwhelmingly a public
sector problem, a dramatic closure of the fiscal deficit
is required.
There is extreme difficulty in closing the deficit from
the revenue side, however, since more than four-fifths
of tax revenue is directly related to the level of
domestic economic activity, and the remainder to
mineral output - tax rates have already been raised
sharply to compensate for the fall in mineral revenues
since 1974. The foreign exchange shortage in itself
prevents the increase in activity levels that is needed to
raise government savings. The government has
therefore tried to achieve sharp increases in mineral
revenues, despite the continuing depression in world
metal prices: a new export levy has been imposed,
against which past and present losses cannot be offset;
substantial rehabilitation and maintenance pro-
grammes in the mines are being funded; the mines are
permitted to retain 35 per cent of their foreign
currency earnings to purchase imported inputs; and
the kwacha has been progressively devalued in
nominal terms to an extent sufficient to allow Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) to show an
operating profit in local currency before the export
levy is deducted (about half ZCCM's total costs are
believed to be foreign currency expenditures). The
channelling of investible funds and foreign currency
retentions to ZCCM in the short-run inevitably
reduces the resources available for diversification.
Despite the poor long run prospects for Zambia's
mining industry, the judgement has been made that
this is the best route to short-run stabilisation, without
which medium-term diversification has little chance.
On the expenditure side, the problem is if anything still
more acute. In 1982 debt service alone was the
equivalent of 27 per cent of total revenue and grants;
the kwacha cost of foreign debt service has since
increased sharply with the large nominal depreciation
of the kwacha. Subsidies (at 33 per cent of receipts, or
19 per cent of outlays in 1982) have been important to
the maintenance of urban living standards, as have
wages and salaries (53 per cent of receipts, 30 per cent
of outlays); direct cuts in these itéms are necessary for
success in adjustment, though, if pressed too far too
quickly, they could jeopardise the political basis of the
reform programme. Defence expenditures have
inevitably been high, though they are not publicly
identified. The government has a strong political
commitment to the maintenance of public sector
employment, and of free education and health
services. At the same time, there is wide agreement
that current non-wage spending on productive sectors
has been too low and needs to be increased if
agricultural and industrial output is to be increased.
The conflicting pressures on the expenditure side of
the budget make it hard to achieve the restructuring
that appears to be needed: reduction in the range of
government activities, a switch from subsidies and
transfers to productive recurrent expenditures, and
probably a reduction in government employment. It is
simpler in the short-run to seek to control the total
nominal level of government spending by economies
across the board, relying upon the effects of rising
inflation to reduce real spending. If the combined
impact of such an expenditure strategy and the
revenue strategy described is a marked reduction in
the deficit as a share of GDP, the incentive to
restructure the budget is likely to be reduced. The
relative success of 1983 and 1984 may well have
produced this perverse result: the pressure to restore
spending levels in a largely unreformed budget
structure seems to have broken through in a 1985
budget which promises a much increased fiscal deficit.
Production Structure Adjustment
Adjustment in the production structure will contribute
to the short-run stabilisation effort, but is even more
fundamental to the longer term effort to restore
growth of incomes for Zambians. In sectoral terms,
structural adjustment means raising the share of
agriculture in GDP, and especially in investment and
exports; it implies a reduction in the share of mining
even though the decline of mining is intended to slow
down. In economic terms (recalling the framework set
out earlier in this article), long-run structural
adjustment has three interrelated facets. First, the cost
structure of the Zambian economy has to be shifted
downwards, both cancelling out the rise that occurred
in the minerals boom of the 1960s and making internal
and external balance compatible with the outlook for
the terms of trade and capital inflows. Cost reduction
requires a sharp increase in the rate of capacity
utilisation, and an associated reduction in labour cost
per unit of output. Second, tradeables production has
to expand relative to non-tradeables (which is not the
same as a move to a more open economy since it
includes efficient import substitution); reduction in
costs will make a major contribution to this shift, but
so too will the easing of import controls and progress
towards a more uniform external tariff. Third, and
perhaps most immediate, part of the shift to tradeables
production involves making existing capacity geared
to the domestic market competitive in export markets.
At present these tasks are being approached by very
large nominal price adjustments: exchange rate
depreciation, decontrol of industrial output prices,
and increases in the administered producer prices for
agricultural products. During 1983 and the first part
of 1984 there were also wage controls; these have now
been abandoned, with implications which are
considered below.
Great weight is being placed upon the efficacy of
nominal depreciation of the kwacha. With other
nominal variables unchanged (especially government
spending and wage levels), exchange rate depreciation
contributes in differing degrees to five objectives. It
should increase the profitability of mining and thus
raise government revenue; it should ease the pressure
of demand on the exchange control system; it should
reduce the real value of government spending in
proportion to its import content; it should raise the
kwacha profitability of exporting (insofar as kwacha
export prices are fixed by the exchange rate, but prices
on domestic markets are free to vary with supply and
demand conditions); and it should raise the price of
tradeables relative to labour, thus inducing expanded
production of both exports and import-substitutes.
These responses are crucially dependent on two
assumptions: first, that other nominal variables do not
change, or at least change by less than the amount of
the depreciation; and, second, that the complementary
inputs needed to allow producers to respond to the
price changes are in fact available. There are
considerable difficulties with both these assumptions.
The objective at which depreciation appears to be
principally aimed at present - and with a high degree
of success - is that of improving the fiscal position by
raising the profitability of mining. In other words, the
exchange rate is being used as an instrument of fiscal
policy, in order to affect external demand by reducing
absorption rather than by switching. Depreciation
certainly has relative price effects in present
circumstances, but these are probably less significant
(in terms of BOP impact) than its fiscal effects, and
other pricing measures (decontrol, producer price
increases and wage restraint) appear to have stronger
relative price effects.
In January 1983 there was an immediate devaluation
of 20 per cent against the SDR. In July 1983 the
kwacha was delinked from the SDR and pegged to an
unannounced basket of currencies; the nominal rate
for the kwacha against the basket has since been
progressively depreciated without the embarrassment
of announcing a large discrete devaluation.
Against an import-weighted basket of currencies the
kwacha depreciated in nominal terms by 43 per cent
from the fourth quarter of 1982 to the third quarter of
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1984. Depreciation has subsequently continued,
Using the conventional IMF inflation adjustment with
consumer price indices, the real depreciation over the
same period was 26 per cent. The January 1983
devaluation approximately restored the position as at
the end of 1980, while the subsequent 'crawl' has
eliminated more than the equivalent of the real
appreciation which occurred in the 1960s. Since
Zambia's external position has deteriorated so much
in the intervening years, the kwacha is of course still a
long way from an 'equilibrium' rate.
In the Zambian case however the conventional
calculation of a real effective exchange rate is not
altogether applicable since it presumes an open
economy without trade controls, and a distinction
between non-tradeable and tradeable sectors which is
not excessively distorted by commercial policy. The
real exchange rate index can therefore be used only as
a rough guide to the economy's relative cost position.
For these reasons it is also important to look at the
effect of the nominal exchange rate itself: it will affect
the extent of smuggling of goods, and parallel market
dealings in foreign exchange; it will also affect the
short run profitability of exporters. If the returns to
non-traditional exporters are effectively fixed in
kwacha terms by the exchange rate, whereas their
prices in the domestic market are to some extent free to
vary, then in conditions of exchange control there will
be a bias in favour of production for the home market.
Nominal exchange rate depreciation can correct this
bias even if the real effective exchange rate does not
depreciate [Krueger, 1983:174-175].
Domestic Price Evolution
In December 1982, the prices of most commodities
were decontrolled (the exceptions were maize meal,
wheat products and candles). As expected, this
measure has produced a significant increase in
consumer price inflation (in combination with the
effects of devaluation and removal of subsidies). In the
year 1983 the official low-income urban consumer
price index rose by 23.5 per cent, compared with
14.2 per cent in 1982. On the basis of figures up to
September 1984, the official rate for 1984 appeared
likely to drop below 20 per cent, suggesting that the
The basket was constructed by the present writer for this article
from ¡MF Direction of Trade data. The Zambian kwacha was
pegged to the SDR until July 1983. The basket used here comprises
the following weights (1979-81 weighted average import distri-
bution):
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main inflationary impact of decontrol occurred in
1983. Nevertheless, apart from queries about the
reliability of the index, the extent of genuine market-
related pricing is open to doubt because of the
dominance of parastatal enterprises in the production
and distribution of consumer goods. (Zambia has
about 138 central government-owned non-financial
public enterprises, and another 165 minor ones owned
by local government.) Pricing by parastatal enterprises
with a significant monopoly position in their markets
is likely to be subject to explicit or implicit
governmental restraints.
Agricultural producer prices have been substantially
raised as part of the reform programme. Nevertheless,
the effect of these changes on the purchasing power of
farmers has not been as dramatic as the nominal
increases might suggest. The most positive case is that
of maize, where the producer price rose by 38 per cent
in real terms between the 1973/74 and 1983/84
seasons. The overall effect has been to produce a
strong relative price shift in favour of maize; this is in
line with national objectives of maize self-sufficiency,
but is not in line with the objective of improving
agricultural production in those drought-prone (and
relatively poor) areas where production of coarse
grains such as sorghum and millet might be favoured.
In cash crops, Zambia has reversed international price
trends for tobacco, but has improved domestic
groundnut prices relative to those prevailing inter-
nationally. The groundnut price change however has
still not prevented extensive smuggling of the
groundnut crop.
During 1983 an effective ceiling of 10 per cent on
money wage increases was maintained as part of the
conditions to be observed in drawing down the IMF
stand-by credit. No up-to-date figures on earnings
movements are available, but it seems likely that
wages were sufficiently restrained to permit an
increase in the ratio of kwacha output prices to labour
costs. Other intermediate input prices, however, are
likely to have increased proportionately with output
prices as a result of devaluation and decontrol. The
very sharp real cut in public spending in 1983 (and the
smaller real cut in 1984) and the associated narrowing
of the fiscal deficit eased both inflationary pressure
below the levels it would otherwise have attained
and the government's claim on available foreign
exchange. Accordingly, it is likely that the pricing
measures taken in the first two years of Zambia's
adjustment programme have met with some successes
in raising the potential profitability of exporting
activities, and tradeables production in general.
In October 1984, however, the government announced
that the 10 per cent wage ceiling was not to be renewed;
instead there would be a 'limited return to collective
US dollar 0.4 173
UK pound 0.3 130
Deutschemark 0. 1078
South African Rand 0.0933
Japanese Yen 0.0686
bargaining'. It is understood that the new IMF Stand-
by agreed in July 1984 contained no condition about
wage regulation; from which it must be inferred that
the IMF (and perhaps the government) believes that
restraint on aggregate demand is sufficient to curtail
wage concessions by employers, while fiscal restraint
will restrain government pay awards. In view of the
strength of Zambia's labour movement and its past
record, the wisdom of abandoning a central wage
guideline is at least questionable. As we have seen, the
1985 budget appears to be less deflationary than the
previous two. For both fiscal and labour market
reasons, therefore, renewed inflationary pressure
seems possible for the current year, threatening the
important relative price changes recently achieved.
Price Changes, Input Constraints and Output
Responses
Far more serious in the short-run, however, is lack of
complementary inputs to enable producers to respond
to price changes. For some years, capacity utilisation
in manufacturing has been informally estimated at
between 30 and 50 per cent. Agricultural activities are
persistently affected by shortages of fertiliser,
equipment, spare parts, fuel and - if crops are
produced, collected and prices actually paid - of
consumer goods to meet farmers' own needs.
Symptoms of the lack of foreign exchange appear in
basic physical and social infrastructure throughout
the country. Much of the 1984 maize crop suffered
collection delays and spoilage because of shortages of
trucks, tyres and fuel. In the absence of a recovery of
import capacity (by increased export earnings, debt
relief or more aid), a rise in tradeables output depends
upon the foreign exchange allocation decisions that
are taken, and on the extent to which import-intensive
production and distribution systems can be replaced
by those which are not. These are in large part political
matters involving public allocation systems (import-
licence, foreign exchange and credit allocation), and
the structure of the public sector (can maize collection
by cooperative unions and NAMBOARD be replaced
by allowing producers to transport their own crop
direct to private millers?). In these areas much less has
been achieved - a situation that has possibly been
obscured by the scale and high profile of nominal price
changes.
In order to encourage 'non-traditional exports' (i.e.
exports other than copper and cobalt) a foreign
exchange retention scheme analogous to that operated
for the mines, but at a higher rate of 50 per cent of
gross export proceeds, was introduced.
The opportunity to earn foreign exchange for use
within the enterprise quickly encouraged local firms
to create at least an exportable margin from existing
capacity. In 1983 non-metal exports registered by the
Bank of Zambia were five times higher than in 1982-
though still at the relatively low level of K77 mn.
Overall foreign exchange allocations to manufacturing
continued to decline in real terms, and allocations to
agriculture have been widely viewed as inadequate.
The government has been forced to allocate foreign
exchange for emergency food imports, and gives
priority to inputs for essential social services. The
retention schemes are therefore helpful only to those
industries which can export successfully at their initial
levels of capacity utilisation. Without the availability
of additional foreign exchange for maintenance,
rehabilitation and new investment, it is difficult to
envisage more than a modest further rise in non-
traditional exports in response to the new incentives.
The IMF stand-by credit agreed in July 1984 relied on
some very optimistic assumptions about copper
production and prices, maize and fertiliser output, and
the expansion of non-traditional exports. The
optimism is necessary to underpin the repayments
consequent on Zambia's borrowings: from 1986
Zambia's repayments to the IMF will exceed its
drawings, and after 1987 there will be no further
drawings at all from the IMF.
Disbursement of the IMF credit early in 1985
reportedly halted after only SDR 80 mn of the SDR
225 mn has been drawn. The Fund and the Zambian
Government were in disagreement over subsidies, the
pace of depreciation, and measures to clear the
payments pipeline. The attempt to accelerate nominal
price adjustments thus jeopardises the momentum of
reform.
Conclusions
The copper revenue boom of the l960s was managed
without a stabilisation strategy: non-tradeables
output expanded, the real exchange rate appreciated,
and non-mineral tradeables production was hampered.
The Zambian reform programme represents a
determined attempt to remove some of the obstacles in
the path of adjustment. It is suggested, however, that
the present reliance of the programme on nominal
price adjustments, while initially helpful, needs to be
shifted towards more direct measures to cope with
Zambia's high cost structure and institutional
problems: measures to reduce public expenditure
obligations, improve agricultural marketing and raise
capacity utilisation.
Finally, it is difficult to see that the programme can be
sustained without some new net foreign exchange
injection, either in debt relief, or in aid. Low capacity
utilisation is itself a major cause of fiscal and cost-
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competitiveness problems, and it is caused by
shortages of foreign exchange. The programme in
Zambia now has sufficient momentum that renewed
foreign exchange inflows need not deflect the
government from its course.
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